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Jun 25, 2019 (posted viaProZ.com): Just finished subtitling/translating several episodes of a Japanese TV show. I'll be translating a contract today (J-E, 9000 words)...more »
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Japanese to English: Economics/Finance book excerpt General field: Bus/Financial
Source text - Japanese ＜最初は日本株売り＞
初動は株売りだった。日銀は昼休み時間中に金融政策の現状維持を決定。ヘッドラインが速報されると、日経平均先物に売り圧力が強まり、１分もかからずに上げ幅を１００円縮めた。午前中には一部で指数連動型上場投資信託受益権（ＥＴＦ）購入額の増額が期待されていたため、失望売りにつながったという。
ただ売りは一時的にとどまり、その後急速に切り返す展開となった。ヘッドラインが流れてから８分後には日経平均先物が発表前と同水準を回復。その後は先物主導で上げ足を速め、日経平均＜.N225＞は一時５０７円高まで駆け上がった。 取引時間中では１２日の直近高値１万４８７４円を上回り、約２週間半ぶりの１万４９００円乗せとなった。その急騰ぶりに市場では「違和感がある」（大手証券トレーダー）との声も多い。
意外高の背景は高水準の空売りにあった。東証が公表している”空売り比率の５日移動平均”では、１７日時点で３３．７１％と０８年１１月の統計開始以来、最高水準に上昇していた。欧米株が戻りを試すなかで日本株はまだ低水準に放置されていたこともあり、「日銀会合がきっかけになり、高水準の空売りが巻き戻されたようだ」（国内証券トレーダー）という。
先物のショートカバーも活発だった。日経平均先物の日中売買高が前日比で７８％増の９万３９９１枚と急増した一方、東証１部の売買代金は前日比２８％増の２兆４３６４億円にとどまっている。現物市場では「前日の米国市場が休場だったこともあり、後場に特段、買い注文が増えたわけではない」（米系証券の現物トレーダー）との声が出ている。
Translation - English The initial response was to sell stocks. During noon recess, the Bank of Japan decided to maintain their current monetary policy. When this was announced on the ticker tape, strong pressure to sell was put on Nikkei average futures, and they lost 100 points of gains within the first minute. Some were hoping for a price increase in Exchange-Traded Funds (ETF) this morning, and it is said that this was linked to selling stocks in disappointment.
Selling briefly halted and rapidly rebounded. 8 minutes after the ticker tape broadcast, the Nikkei Average Futures recovered to the same price level as prior to the announcement. Consequently, the futures-led uptrend accelerated, and the Nikkei Average skyrocketed by 507 points. It surpassed the most recent record price of February 12th’s 14874 points and reached the 14900-point level – the highest in two and a half weeks. Many leading securities traders commented that the sudden surge was “unnatural.”
Behind the unexpected price increase was the high price level of short-selling. According to the 5-day moving average of the short sale ratio as published by the Tokyo Stock Exchange, it reached 33.71% on the 17th, the highest it has been since records began in November 2008. Compared to the improving stocks in Europe and the United States, Japanese stocks are still left at low levels. A Japanese securities trader commented that “it seems that the Bank of Japan meeting has sparked the rewinding of the high level of short-selling.”
The short covering of futures was also active. The intraday trading volume of the Nikkei Average Futures sharply rose up 78% from the day before, to 93991 shares. Meanwhile, the trading value of the TSE 1st section has only risen 28% from the previous day, remaining at 2.436 trillion points. As for the spot market, a spot trader at an American securities company has stated that “there has not been a marked increase of buy orders during the afternoon session, as the U.S. stock market was closed the day before.”
English to Japanese: Economics/Finance book excerpt General field: Bus/Financial
Source text - English Unfortunately the Great Recession that began in 2007 had other aspects to it that spread the economic damage in virulent and scary ways.
Many American households were “excessively leveraged,” meaning that they had borrowed far more than they could manage.
The housing boom had encouraged ever bigger houses with ever bigger mortgages.
Subprime mortgages (a financial innovation, one must admit) made it easier for people to borrow who were otherwise not creditworthy and for other people to borrow in particularly aggressive ways (e.g., with no down payment at all).
This all works fine when housing prices are going up; someone who falls behind on their mortgage payments can always sell the house to repay the loan.
When the housing bubble burst, however, the numbers became a disaster
Overleveraged American families found that they could not afford their mortgage payments, nor could they sell their homes.
Millions of houses and condos were thrown into foreclosure by whatever bank or financial institution owned the mortgage.
When these properties were dumped on the market, it drove prices down further and exacerbated all the real estate-induced problems.
But we haven’t even arrived at the scary part yet.
America’s mortgage problem spread to the financial sector through two related channels.
First, banks were plagued with lots of bad real estate loans, which made them less able and willing to make new loans.
Anyone looking to buy a home had trouble doing so, even with good credit and a large down payment. (You guessed it: This compounded the real estate problems yet again.)
Meanwhile, Wall Street investment banks and hedge funds had loaded up on real estate derivatives – fancy products like mortgage-backed securities whose value was somehow tied to the plunging real estate market.
Like American homeowners, these institutions had borrowed heavily to make such investments, so they too faced creditors.
Much of this debt was “insured” with the credit default swaps described in Chapter 7, wreaking havoc on firms with that exposure.
Translation - Japanese 残念ながら、2007年に始まった大不況は他の面でも経済的な損害を恐ろしく広げた。
アメリカの多くの家庭は返済力を超える額を借りてしまっており、「債務過剰」だった。住宅ブームの影響で住宅の大きさや値段はどんどん増加していたが、頭金（購入者がローンを組むために支払うお金）は、借りられていた金額に対して少なくなっていった。サブプライム住宅ローンのおかげで、信用力のない人達がお金を借りられるようになり、ほかの人も、「頭金なし」などといった絶好の条件でお金を借りることができた。住宅価格が上がっている限りこのシステムは機能する――住宅ローンの支払いに遅れた人は、いつでも家を売却し、ローンを返済できる。しかし住宅バブルが崩壊したとき、このシステムは大惨事をまねいた。債務過剰に悩むアメリカの家庭は住宅ローンが払えなくなり、住宅を売りたくても売れなかった。住宅ローンを提供していた銀行や金融機関は、何百万もの住宅やマンションを差し押さえた。この大量な物件が一斉に市場に出回ると、価格はさらに減少し、不動産業界が招いた問題がさらに悪化した。
だが、本当に恐ろしいのはここからだ。アメリカの住宅ローン問題は、二つのルートによって金融セクターへと燃え移った。まず、銀行は大量の不良不動産融資に悩まされ、新しいローンを組むことを拒んだ。高い信用格付けと多額の頭金を用意しても、住宅を買うのは困難だった。（読者が察する通り、これは事態を悪化させた。）一方、ウォール街の投資銀行やヘッジファンドは不動産デリバティブを大量に買い込んだ。これは、モーゲージ証券などといった、価値が不動産の急落と連動しているしゃれた商品だ。先ほどの住宅所有者のように、これらの機関は不動産デリバティブを買うために多額の借金をしていたので、債権者に迫られていた。このほとんどの借金は、7章に取り上げられている「クレジット・デフォルト・スワップ」で保険をかけていたので、そのリスクを抱えていた企業は大損害を受けた。
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Master's degree - Middlebury Institute of International Studies (Candidate)
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I am an experienced translator working in Japanese to English, with more than 8 years of experience as a freelance translator.
I also offer desktop publishing, website localization (WordPress) and subtitling services.
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